[Deathpenalty] death penalty news----ARIZ., CALIF., USA
Rick Halperin
rhalperi at smu.edu
Wed Mar 30 11:42:04 CDT 2016
March 30
ARIZONA:
Detective called to testify at hearing
The prosecutor in the trial of a man accused of killing an 8-year-old Bullhead
City girl is calling a Bullhead City detective to testify at an upcoming
Chronis hearing.
Justin James Rector, 27, is charged with first-degree murder, kidnapping, child
abuse and abandonment of a dead body in the death of Isabella Grogan-Cannella
on Sept. 2, 2014, and leaving her body in a shallow grave near her Bullhead
City home. Prosecutors are seeking the death penalty.
Deputy Mohave County Attorney Greg McPhillips issued a subpoena last week to
call Detective Brandon Grasse to testify at a May 6 evidentiary hearing.
McPhillips only needs to prove 1 aggravating factor before Superior Court Judge
Lee Jantzen to seek the death penalty.
In Arizona, there are 14 aggravating factors that can be used to determine the
death penalty. 1 factor that would be determined is the age of the victim,
which Grasse will testify to in this case since Grogan-Cannella was only 8
years old at the time of her murder. A birth certificate could also prove the
victim's age.
Factors can include that the victim was 70 years or older, a child under the
age of 15, or a police officer. Other factors include that the murder was
committed in a cruel or heinous manner, the defendant committed multiple
murders, or the defendant committed murder in connection with a street gang.
Rector's 10-week trial is set to begin Oct. 17 with a pre-trial hearing set for
Aug. 23. Rector is being held in county jail without bond. Mesa attorney Gerald
Gavin was appointed as Rector's primary attorney in March 2015. 2 defense
attorneys are required in death penalty cases.
Jantzen has yet to rule on several defense motions, including another recent
motion claiming imposition of the death penalty endangers Rector's Eighth
Amendment right to be free from suffering a painful death. Jantzen has denied
previous motions to preclude the death penalty.
In Arizona, a jury in a death penalty case determines if a defendant is guilty
or innocent of 1st-degree murder. If the defendant is convicted, the jury then
determines if he or she is to be sentenced to death or to life in prison.
(source: Mohave Valley Daily News)
CALIFORNIA:
Businessman charged in 'diabolic' slaying of Santa Barbara herbalist and family
A businessman was charged Tuesday with killing a well-known Chinese herbalist,
his wife and 5-year-old daughter inside their hillside Santa Barbara home for
financial gain, prosecutors said.
Pierre Haobsh, 26, of Oceanside faces 3 felony counts of 1st-degree murder,
according to the Santa Barbara County district attorney's office. Prosecutors
further allege that Haobsh was lying in wait when he committed the murders.
Haobsh was scheduled to be arraigned Tuesday afternoon in Santa Barbara.
If he is convicted of the murders, Haobsh could face the death penalty or life
in prison without parole. Prosecutors plan to decide on whether to pursue the
death penalty after the preliminary hearing.
The slain couple ran a popular Chinese herbal clinic on State Street in Santa
Barbara, and Han was the author of several books on Chinese herbal medicine.
Weidong Henry Han, 57; Huijie "Jennie" Yu, 29; and their daughter, Emily, were
found dead Wednesday night inside their gated, 7-acre ranchette off the 101
Freeway.
Han's colleagues became concerned about his whereabouts when he didn't show up
for a business meeting earlier that day. They went to his home and found the
front door ajar and the family's vehicles outside.
Pierre Haobsh, 27, of Oceanside was arrested in San Diego County in connection
with the deaths of Weidong Henry Han, his wife, Huijie Yu, and their 5-year-old
daughter.
Deputies were notified and found the victims' bodies wrapped in plastic and
duct tape in the garage, said Sheriff Bill Brown of the Santa Barbara County
Sheriff's Office.
An autopsy determined all three victims died of gunshot wounds to the head,
sheriff's Lt. Brad McVay said Tuesday.
Brown called the slayings "diabolic, premeditated."
Within the first 32 hours of the family's killings, investigators began
interviewing friends, relatives, neighbors and business associates who led them
to Haobsh, Brown said.
Detectives think Haobsh was recently involved in a business transaction with
Han, the sheriff said.
They then obtained a warrant to arrest Haobsh.
Detectives began monitoring Haobsh and spotted him about 12:30 a.m. Friday at a
gas station in San Diego County, where they arrested him.
A loaded 9-millimeter handgun and property belonging to one of the victims was
found inside Haobsh's car, Brown said.
"This tragic case is a terrible blow to the Santa Barbara community and the
medical community at large," he said.
(source: Los Angeles Times)
***********
Defense attorney in Oakland death penalty case says there's lack of evidence
for fatal shootings of girl, man
The defense lawyer for an Oakland man charged with 2 counts of murder for the
fatal shootings of an 8-year-old girl and a 22-year-old man in separate
shootings in 2013 told jurors Tuesday that there's not enough evidence for a
conviction.
In her opening statement in the trial of Darnell Williams, 25, who is charged
in the deaths of 8-year-old Alaysha Carradine during a sleepover at an East
Oakland home on July 17, 2013, and 22-year-old Anthony Medearis in Berkeley in
an unrelated shooting 7 weeks later, defense lawyer Deborah Levy said Williams
wasn't the shooter in either incident.
Levy said 2 key prosecution witnesses who connect Williams to the fatal
shootings aren't credible because they are prostitutes.
"These women are not believable," she said. Levy told jurors, "Listen to the
evidence, you have to connect the dots and there is not enough evidence, ladies
and gentlemen."
In his opening statement on Monday, prosecutor John Brouhard alleged that
Williams carried out a "rampage of violence."
Brouhard said Williams carried out the shooting that claimed Alaysha's life at
an apartment in the 3400 block of Wilson Street at about 11:15 p.m. in
retaliation for the shooting death of 26-year-old Jermaine Davis in the 1800
block of Derby Street in Berkeley about 4 hours earlier.
Along with killing Alaysha, the shooting wounded 2 other children and a
63-year-old woman.
Brouhard said Davis was a close friend of Williams, who allegedly wanted to
kill Antiown York, the man he thought had killed Davis. He fired shots into the
apartment on Wilson Street because York's ex-girlfriend, the mother of York's
children, lived there, the prosecutor said.
The mother wasn't home when Williams opened fire but Williams fired 13 shots
that struck Alaysha, York's 2 young children and their grandmother, according
to Brouhard.
The prosecutor alleged that Williams fatally shot Medearis in the 1400 block of
Eighth Street in Berkeley in an unrelated incident about 5:45 p.m. on Sept. 8,
2013, because he thought that Medearis had "snitched" about his involvement in
a previous robbery.
Brouhard said Williams also wanted to rob Medearis, who he confronted at a dice
game, because he was out of money.
The prosecution is seeking the death penalty for Williams, who faces two counts
of murder for the deaths of Alaysha and Medearis, three counts of attempted
murder for the shooting on July 17, 2013, assault with a semi-automatic firearm
for accidentally shooting his nephew in the face in the Berkeley incident and 2
counts of being an ex-felon in possession of a gun.
Williams also faces 3 special circumstance allegations: committing multiple
murders, lying in wait in the shooting that claimed Alaysha's life and killing
Medearis during the course of an attempted robbery.
(source: KRON news)
*****************
Man on death row for Spring Valley murder dies
A man who spent 35 years on death row for murdering and dismembering a Spring
Valley mother of 2 died of natural causes over the weekend, authorities
reported.
Bernard Lee Hamilton, 64, was pronounced dead Saturday morning at a Sacramento
medical center, according to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
A San Diego County jury sentenced Hamilton to death in March 1981 for the
slaying two years earlier of 24-year-old Eleanore Buchanan, CDCR Lt. Sam
Robinson said.
Hamilton was convicted of kidnapping and murdering Buchanan on May 31, 1979,
after she caught him burglarizing her vehicle in a parking lot at Mesa College,
where she was enrolled in a night math class.
Her body, missing the head and hands, was found the next day alongside
Interstate 8 in Pine Valley. Buchanan, who had given birth to her 2nd son 3
weeks earlier, had been stabbed multiple times.
At the time of the crime, Hamilton lived with his parents in Linda Vista, about
a mile from the college the victim attended. He was arrested a week after the
killing in Oklahoma, where deputies spotted him driving the victim's stolen
blue Dodge van.
Jurors found Hamilton guilty of murder and burglary in January 1981.
Since 1978, when California reinstated capital punishment, 70 condemned inmates
have died of natural causes, 25 have committed suicide, 8 have died from other
causes and 15 have been executed.
There currently are 747 offenders on California's death row, Robinson said.
(source: ABC news)
USA:
There hasn't been a criminal defense lawyer on the Supreme Court in 25 years.
That's a problem.
It's been a quarter-century since a former criminal defense lawyer sat on the
Supreme Court.
Since then, crime has fallen by half. Incarceration has risen, then fallen
(slightly) again. Americans are becoming more and more critical of the
"tough-on-crime" mindset that defined the end of the 20th century, and more
skeptical that police and prosecutors will always use their powers for good -
in other words, they're coming in line with how defense lawyers see the world.
But when Barack Obama made his third (and likely final) Supreme Court
nomination last week, he nominated Merrick Garland.
Garland is a former prosecutor with a tough-on-crime record. The Court already
has 2 ex-prosecutors.
Appellate defense lawyer Timothy O'Toole points out that the Court has veterans
of both sides of civil cases (defendants' and plaintiffs' lawyers) and one side
of criminal cases (prosecutors). "But the one group that seems kind of outside
that box, particularly on the Supreme Court, are defense lawyers. And that's a
shame."
Defense lawyers and scholars worry this isn't an accident; it's the result of
the structure that shapes who can get nominated to the Supreme Court to begin
with. Federal judges tend to be people who "ticked all the political checkboxes
on their career starting from when they were 15," says Tejas Bhatt, assistant
public defender for New Haven, Connecticut. Often one of those boxes is working
as a prosecutor.
Even beyond any particular career experience, the system rewards "people who
don't take controversial positions, they don't do controversial things, who
don't issue controversial opinions, who do seem to hew more toward law and
order and enforcement."
There's good reason to be concerned about the jurisprudence of a court that
only understands one side of a criminal case from experience - and since the
high-water mark of the 1960s, defense lawyers have seen the Supreme Court put
serious restrictions on the right against self-incrimination, the right against
unreasonable search, and even the right to a lawyer.
But to many of them, this isn't just a problem with jurisprudence. It's a
problem with the Supreme Court in a democracy - and in an increasingly diverse
America. They believe the politics of Supreme Court confirmations has limited
all but a very narrow, very privileged slice of America to have a shot at a
seat on the highest court in the land. And one of the groups who they fear are
locked out is the people whose job it is to stand up for the rights of the
marginalized - and those who are on the wrong side of well-intentioned laws.
The dangers of a prosecutor-friendly Court
Here's what's at stake. A large swath of the Bill of Rights is dedicated to
protecting suspects in criminal investigations and defendants in criminal
trials: the right against unreasonable search in the Fourth Amendment; the
right against self-incrimination and the right to due process in the Fifth
Amendment; the right to a jury trial and a lawyer in the Sixth Amendment; the
right against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.
In theory, how far these rights really extend is a matter of constitutional
interpretation - transcending justices' personal sympathies (for victims of
crime, for the accused, for prosecutors) or their feelings toward the criminal
justice system in America today.
In practice? Nah.
In 2005, Boston University law professor Ward Farnsworth suggested that how
much a justice thought the Constitution protected defendants relied more on how
the justice felt about defendants than how she felt about the Constitution.
By analyzing decisions in criminal law cases from 1953 to 2002 - separating
cases in which people claimed their constitutional rights had been violated
from other criminal cases (involving, say, the interpretation of a federal law
or a procedural rule) - Farnsworth found a pattern.
In non-constitutional cases, where the disagreements were largely about policy,
some justices consistently sided with the prosecution and others consistently
sided with the defense. That's predictable enough - some judges (often
conservative) tend to favor law and order, while others (often liberal) tend to
be skeptical of law enforcement.
But the same thing happened in cases where, in theory, the justices were
disagreeing about constitutional rights. Justices who sided against defendants
in policy cases also tended to see their constitutional rights as narrower.
Justices who sided with defendants in policy cases tended to agree that their
constitutional rights were more expansive too.
If you're already used to thinking of Supreme Court justices as political
actors, this correlation isn't surprising. But that doesn't mean it's not
important. Over the past half-century, we've seen how much the Court's
interpretation of the rights of defendants can vary - and how much it matters.
50 years ago, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court gave us the
right to a public defender as we know it (Gideon v. Wainwright). It gave us the
idea that a suspect must be told of his right to remain silent (Miranda v.
Arizona). It gave us the rule that any evidence obtained under an
unconstitutional search - even if it proves the defendant's guilt - is
prohibited from being entered in court (Mapp v. Ohio). It gave us the
requirement that if the prosecution discovers evidence that might prove the
defendant wasn't guilty, it has to turn that evidence over to the defense
(Brady v. Maryland).
But in the decades since, the Court has eroded those rights.
Defendants now have to declare that they're invoking the right to remain silent
in order to end questioning. The right to a lawyer has been (in the eyes of
some) compromised, as the Court has given the government more power to seize
bank accounts that could be used to pay for defense. And the right to exclude
illegally obtained evidence has been rendered less meaningful, as the Court has
carved out more and more exceptions for police to engage in searches and
surveillance without a warrant.
As Farnsworth found, ideological sympathies definitely shape constitutional
jurisprudence ??? and personal experience shapes ideological sympathies. The
concern of a prosecutor-stacked Court is that its members might be too likely
to zero in on the guilt of the defendant, and forgive the methods used to catch
him.
But working as a prosecutor doesn't automatically flip a switch and make
someone permanently more sympathetic to prosecutors - just look at former
prosecutor Chief Justice Warren himself. Or just look at the 2 former
prosecutors currently on the Court - Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Sonia
Sotomayor.
The Court's current ex-prosecutors see the law in very different ways
"Having experience as a prosecutor probably tells you something about where
people's values were when they decided to get a job as a lawyer at the
beginning," says O'Toole.
In the case of Samuel Alito (who's been on the Court since 2005), that's
abundantly clear: Alito once wrote on a job application that his interest in
the law had been inspired by his disagreement with the liberal, pro-defendant
decisions made in the 1960s by the Warren Court.
He's certainly made his dissatisfaction felt - by helping roll back many of
those decisions.
Alito wrote the 2013 opinion Salinas v. Texas, which said that the defendant
had to explicitly say he was remaining silent in order for it to count. Where
the Warren Court limited the police's ability to obtain evidence in searches,
Alito wrote the 2014 opinion Fernandez v. California - which ruled that it was
legal for police to search a residence even if one of the occupants objects, as
long as that occupant isn't around (i.e., he's already been arrested).
"Alito quite clearly has a disdain for people who are on the other side of
crime, and a lack of respect for people who are defendants in the criminal
justice system," says appeals court defense attorney Matt Kaiser.
If Alito is evidence that "once a prosecutor, always a prosecutor," the Court's
other former prosecutor, Sonia Sotomayor, represents an alternative that
O'Toole and other lawyers say is common: judges whose experience as prosecutors
leads them to have a more realistic, tempered view of law enforcement.
Thanks to what law professor Tony O'Rourke calls a "healthier appreciation of,
let's say, the diversity of professionalism" among police and prosecutors in
the field, Sotomayor is arguably the most pro-defendant justice on the current
Court.
When other justices ruled that a suspect had to explicitly say, "I want to
remain silent," to keep his Miranda rights in a 2014 case, Sotomayor pointed
out: "The Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should use those magic
words, and there is little reason to believe police - who have ample incentives
to avoid invocation - will provide such guidance."
O'Rourke points out that while Sotomayor and Alito were both prosecutors, they
weren't the same type of prosecutor. "Justice Sotomayor cut her teeth in the
Manhattan District Attorney's Office," he says. "She's used to dealing with the
realities of a relatively resource-constrained prosecutor's office, as opposed
to, say, a US attorney's office." In other words, she's used to criminal
investigations that are constrained not just by rules, but by the logistical
realities of a broad caseload and a sometimes less-than-professional police
force.
Alito, on the other hand, "was in a US attorney's office in a relatively elite
district." His police force - the FBI - was a fairly professional one. So the
things that kept him from doing his job the way he wanted to do it were,
O'Rourke says, "the internal policies and practices of the US attorney's
manual." It makes sense that he'd regard those as unwelcome bureaucratic
constraints.
But of course, the fact of the matter is that Sonia Sotomayor and Samuel Alito
weren't identical people before they started their respective law careers.
Sotomayor's experience as a prosecutor is layered on top of her experience as a
Latina from a working-class family. Her background is more similar to some of
the defendants than to that of other justices on the Court.
That matters. Like it or not, the justices are more concerned about
constitutional overreach by law enforcement when they can imagine themselves,
or people like them, as the targets.
Rachel Levinson-Waldman, a privacy expert at the Brennan Center for Justice,
argues that this explains a few recent decisions the Court has made restricting
law enforcement's use of technology.
Previously, she says, the Court had ruled that individuals couldn't expect
privacy from law enforcement when doing anything in public (say, driving
around). But in 2012, the Court ruled that attaching a GPS device to a
suspect's car qualified as a police search under the Fourth Amendment.
"One of the things that changed the justices' mode of thinking,"
Levinson-Waldman says, "is, 'Wait a minute, these GPS devices could be put onto
our cars if the government's theory is right.' That's when it started to seem
very personal."
Something similar happened in 2014, when the Court ruled that police couldn't
search a suspect's cellphone without a warrant: Justices "went, 'I have a
cellphone, I have an iPhone,'" Levinson-Waldman says.
"But these surveillance technologies don't just come into existence when they
affect the lives of basically wealthy, highly educated, highly powerful
people," she continues. "They are used far before that. They're used first on
marginalized communities, they're used on communities of color." They're used
on people in whom only Sotomayor might recognize herself.
The system that encourages would-be Supreme Court justices to start planning
out their careers at the age of 15 doesn't allow for many Sonia Sotomayors.
They're more likely to be "the 1 percent of the 1 percent," says Bhatt.
Only people from elite backgrounds are likely to know at a young age that
there's a fairly established career path for the federal judiciary: "Go to a
prestigious law school, work at some big white-collar firm, go to the US
attorney's office, put in my time there, and then get nominated to the bench."
And their risk-averse route doesn't allow them to come into contact with the
people who tend to rely on the Bill of Rights' criminal protections the most.
Former prosecutors assume all prosecutors are as scrupulous as they were
The problem isn't that mediocre prosecutors get rewarded with federal
judgeships, much less slots on the Supreme Court. It's the opposite.
Ex-prosecutors who make it to the Supreme Court - the Sonia Sotomayors, Samuel
Alitos, and perhaps Merrick Garlands of the world - were only the best, most
scrupulous prosecutors. That creates its own failure of empathy.
"Here's the core problem," says Kaiser, the criminal appeals lawyer. "When
prosecutors are on the Supreme Court and they're making rules about criminal
cases, and they're making rules about what prosecutors are supposed to do, they
think about themselves when they think about people following those rules."
Those blind spots become most apparent when the Court is presented with a case
where prosecutors try to use the Supreme Court's own rules as a way to gain the
upper hand.
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court took a case out of Louisiana regarding the
Warren-era precedent Brady v. Maryland, which established that it's illegal for
prosecutors to withhold evidence if it would change the outcome of a trial.
When prosecutors violate Brady, and that gets found out later, the conviction
is often overturned.
In the eyes of many Supreme Court justices, the point of Brady is to ensure
that prosecutors see it as their job to turn over potentially exculpatory
evidence. In the eyes of many prosecutors, though, the point of Brady is that
it gives them a step-by-step guide to when they do and don't have to turn over
evidence.
The Louisiana case showed just how far apart those perspectives really are. In
oral arguments, the lawyer for the Louisiana prosecutors admitted that "a
prudent prosecutor would have" told defenders that one of the key eyewitnesses
at the trial had initially told police he couldn't identify the perpetrators.
But the lawyer argued that just because the prosecutors were imprudent didn't
mean they'd violated Brady - because the prosecutors believed that the evidence
wouldn't have changed the case's outcome, and that meant they were in the
clear.
As defense lawyer Bidish Sarma wrote on the American Constitution Society blog,
"[S]everal Supreme Court justices appear genuinely shocked to hear that
prosecutors rely upon Brady [...] to decide before trial whether to turn
evidence over to the defendant." They assume that Brady is about a deeper
ethical obligation - because that's the obligation they, as prosecutors, would
feel.
"If you have a bunch of people who are assuming that prosecutors are in every
case diligent and zealous about making sure they meet both the spirit and the
letter of their constitutional obligations," says Kaiser, "and then you have a
bunch of people who think Brady is a game where they can withhold evidence to
secure their conviction, they'll just have rules that hurt defendants."
Defense lawyers are already "attuned" to the dispossessed
Obviously, the problem of Supreme Court justices seeing the law as it should be
practiced, rather than as it actually is, is something too deep for any
president to fix with a single appointment. But Kaiser and others point out
that cases involving evidence under Brady, for example, might be a lot easier
to resolve if anyone on the Court had had experience using evidence to assemble
a defense.
"When you see former defense lawyers write on or rule on those issues from the
trial bench, it's not an imagination game; it's an experience game," says
Timothy O'Toole. "You've got somebody who's formulated dozens of defenses from
information just like that."
O'Toole mentions that the Supreme Court hasn't always understood the importance
of having separate hearings during the sentencing phase of capital trials. In
his experience, the ability to explain the circumstances of his clients' lives
and upbringings has been critically important to whether or not they're willing
to put him to death.
If you haven't "looked into the juror's eyes when they see what a client has
been through," he says, you can't understand just how important those hearings
are to protecting the client's rights against cruel and unusual punishment.
This is a fairly straightforward diversity argument: that it's good for the
Supreme Court to be able to draw on as broad a stream of personal experiences
as possible. But the real asset that former defenders bring to the judiciary,
defense lawyers believe, is that they're used to seeing the law from the
perspective of those they represent - and thinking in terms of its flaws.
That doesn't just mean the pro-defendant viewpoint would be more strongly
represented on the Court: Mere representation might still put a former defense
attorney on the wrong side of a lot of 8-1 decisions. But lawyers are confident
that having that viewpoint represented can help the other justices understand
the principles at stake - even if they're focused on the guilt or innocence of
particular defendants instead.
The federal bench is getting more diverse - but the Supreme Court is still a
glass ceiling
"President Obama has actually done a very good job of my view of trying to
diversify the federal courts" with defenders "in a way that hasn't really
happened in my memory," O'Toole says. "There are a lot more public defenders on
the federal bench now than 10 to 15 years ago."
When the Supreme Court rules on a criminal case, the composition of the lower
courts matters a lot.
One example: a series of Supreme Court decisions that have restored some
flexibility in sentencing to federal judges. In the past, Kaiser says, if
something like that happened, the Supreme Court would "give some discretion to
the lower courts, and they'd gum that rule to death." But the lower courts have
been "a lot more respectful" of this line of cases, "accepting the
defendant-friendly implications."
The impact has been enormous: From October 2014 to September 2015, slightly
more than half of all federal sentences were shorter than the recommendations
judges were afraid to stray from a decade ago.
But so far, that increase in former defense lawyers on the federal bench hasn't
worked its way up to the Supreme Court.
The Garland nomination was particularly painful to defenders, because they were
so close. One shortlisted judge, Jane Kelly of the Eighth Circuit, was a former
public defender - who had also been a victim of crime herself. In Kaiser's
words, she had "the best profile for a public defender candidate that you're
likely to see for the Supreme Court." She was their best chance.
But reports in the days before the appointment suggested Obama had deliberately
taken Kelly off the Supreme Court shortlist, because he was worried that her
experience representing violent criminals in court would make her overly
controversial with Republicans (who were already threatening to obstruct every
Obama nominee).
"John Adams defended the British troops who had fired in the Boston Massacre,"
O'Toole points out. "But apparently that wasn't as big a political liability
then." Even with emerging skepticism of tough-on-crime attitudes, though,
today's politicians are still too cautious to emulate the founders in this
regard.
It's a vicious cycle.
When former defenders are seen as too controversial to be nominated to the
Supreme Court, young lawyers who might want to be Supreme Court justices one
day get scared away from becoming defenders. When the Court doesn't have anyone
who can relate to defendants in criminal cases, it makes decisions that aren't
favorable to defendants.
When the Court restricts the constitutional rights of defendants, it gets
harder for their lawyers to persuade lower-court and local judges and juries
that their clients have rights, and that those rights are more important than
the facts of what they did.
"Every important [criminal justice] decision came in the wake of somebody who
did some pretty horrible things," says Bhatt. Ernesto Miranda was charged with
kidnapping, rape, and robbery. Clarence Gideon "was a robber, and a thief, and
a card shark."
But they still deserved the due process of law. That's the principle that the
Warren Court upheld, and that the current Court is at risk of hollowing out.
(source: vox.com)
************
Prosecutors: Defense move would extend Rodriguez's death penalty appeal in
Sjodin murder
Federal prosecutors in the death penalty appeal of a man who killed a
University of North Dakota student in 2003 say a request by defense attorneys
to withdraw from the case could be seen as a "disguised delay tactic."
Alfonso Rodriguez Jr's lawyers say a new defense team is needed because of
staffing and personnel changes in the federal system and the Minnesota federal
public defender's office.
Prosecutor Keith Reisenauer says in his response that he is opposed to the
change. He says granting the defense motion will likely postpone proceedings
for at least a year or more. The final appeal was filed more than 5 years ago.
Rodriguez, of Crookston, Minnesota, sits on death row in Terre Haute, Indiana,
for killing Dru Sjodin, of Pequot Lakes, Minnesota.
(source: Associated Press)
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