[Deathpenalty] death penalty news----worldwide

[Rick Halperin]

Jan. 25



SAUDI ARABIA:

Saudi Executions: Rhetoric Versus Reality

Since 2011, when the Arab Spring erupted in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
ruling family has faced a host of challenges to its legitimacy. Some of this 
opposition has manifested in the form of peaceful protests, calling for 
democracy and greater freedoms. The monarchy, which has been in power for 
almost 9 decades, sees these protests as an existential threat to its rule.

It is important to take stock of the political calculations which drove the 
Saudis to carry out 158 executions in 2015 - the highest figure since 1995, 
which equated to roughly one execution every other day. Furthermore, the 
January 2, 2016 execution of the internationally revered Shi'ite cleric Nimr 
Baqir al-Nimr, along with 3 other Shi'ite activists, sheds light on Riyadh???s 
handling of political dissent in the Eastern Province (EP), where most of the 
nation's Shi'ites reside.

The Koran and the Sunnah of the Prophet guide Saudi Arabia's political, social, 
and religious institutions. The Basic Laws (1992), which appear in the form of 
a constitution, confirm this religious-based set of institutions.

Though the Basic Laws are legally binding, they can never take precedence over 
the Koran or the Sunna. They simply reaffirm or complement what is written in 
these 2 sources. In particular, several articles in the Basic Laws highlight 
this reality.

In relation to the legal system, all laws governing Saudi Arabia are derived 
from the Koran and the Sunnah, in the form of Sharia (Islamic) law. Article 38 
of the Basic Laws states that "there shall be no crime or penalty except in 
accordance with the Sharia." In turn, all courts at all levels within the Saudi 
state can only render rulings derived directly from Sharia law.

Crime and Punishment under Saudi Arabian Law

Although Saudi Arabia's legal system derives purely from the Koran and the 
Sunnah, there are a number of supplementary legal principles and procedures 
which have come into existence. These reaffirm and complement whatever is laid 
out in the Sharia, but also help bring the kingdom's legal system into the 
modern era. Before engaging in the crux of the discussion, it is vital to first 
define the criminal law process in Saudi Arabia and highlight the rights 
attributed to defendants under Sharia law.

In 2001, Saudi Arabia passed The Regulation on Criminal Procedure, which 
stipulates that "no punishment may be inflicted except for crimes prohibited by 
Shariaa principles and Saudi national regulations." It is comprised of 3 
categories, which are all derived from Islamic law.

The 1st category is hadd (pl. haddud), a crime for which there are fixed 
Koranic punishments. The haddud entail crimes "that threaten Islam," and 
punishment for these crimes are fixed because they are "the right of Allah." 
Examples of these crimes include Koranic Verses 5:33 and 5:38, which define the 
punishments for robbery and civil disturbance and for theft, respectively.

Robbery and civil disturbance are punishable by death, including by 
crucifixion, or by the amputation of limbs (5:33). Theft is punishable by 
amputation. There are also numerous hadith from the Prophet Muhammad, which are 
used to derive what defines a crime and what the punishment is for that crime. 
A clear example is the hadith from the Prophet, in which he declared the 
punishment for apostasy. He said "Whoever changes his religion, kill him."

For one to be convicted and punished for hadd crimes, the strictest and 
strongest form of proof is required. Critically, there must be 2 to 4 
witnesses, depending on the crime. For the majority of haddud crimes, 2 direct 
witness are required. However, for the crime of adultery or rape, Sharia law 
requires 4 witnesses. 2nd, the accused must confess. The different schools 
within Islamic law (Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafi'i, and Maliki) diverge on how many 
times a confession must be spoken. However, they all agree that a confession is 
legally required for the death penalty to be legally binding. This confession 
must come freely from the accused. If the accused were to revoke his confession 
(for example if it was coerced or forced), a judge cannot invoke the hadd 
punishment. Insistence on the highest standards of certainty of guilt for hadd 
crimes is an unquestionable premise of Islamic law.

The 2nd category is Qisas (retaliation). This is an 'eye for an eye' situation, 
typically related to cases involving murder. It refers to the ability of the 
relatives of the murdered to forgive the murderer, seek financial compensation 
from them, or demand the murderer's death. The Koran refers to Qisas in verse 
2:138. There are also several hadith on the subject of Qisas, most prominently 
coming from al-Bukhari. He is a revered historian, who formulated the first 
thorough compilation of scholarly work on hadith, deciding which actions and 
sayings could genuinely be attributed to the Prophet.

Finally, there is the category of ta'zir (literally chastisement or 
castigation). The stringent conditions of proof required to convict a person of 
a hadd crime means that the vast majority of crimes brought before Islamic 
courts in the wider world are ta'zir cases. These cases are brought before a 
judge and all decisions on punishment are at the judge's discretion. It is 
important to note that that a judge can impose any punishment in a ta'zir case, 
except the death penalty. According to the Saudi legal system, the death 
penalty can only be imposed if one is accused and found guilty of committing a 
hadd crime.

The Rights of the Accused Under the Saudi Legal System

Numerous additional legal principles and procedures that protect the rights of 
the accused from the moment of arrest to the trial exemplify the stringent 
requirement of proof necessary to convict a person of a hadd crime in Saudi 
Arabia. Among these are 3 statutes in particular.

The 1st is The Statute of Principles of Arrest, Temporary Confinement and 
Preventive Detention (issued on November 11, 1983). This prohibits arbitrary 
arrest and authorities are not allowed to detain suspects for longer than 3 
days before formally charging them. 2nd is The Law of Procedure before Shari'a 
Courts (issued in September, 2001), which grants defendants the right to legal 
representation. 3rd is The Law of Criminal Procedure (issued in May, 2002), 
which protects a defendant's rights with regard to interrogation, 
investigation, and incarceration. Further, it outlines a series of regulations 
that justice and law enforcement authorities must follow during all stages 
throughout the judicial process, from arrest and the investigation process in 
particular, to the trial. This law prohibits torture and again protects the 
right of all suspects to obtain legal representation.

The language of this last law was recently updated in 2013, and the language 
became more comprehensive in relation to arresting an individual or group. It 
states that "no person shall be arrested, searched, detained, or imprisoned 
except in cases provided by law, and any accused person shall have the right to 
seek the assistance of a lawyer or a representative to defend him during the 
investigation and trial stages."

A Divergence between Rhetoric and Reality

Having mapped out the kingdom's legal system, this author believes that 
political, not Islamic, considerations motivated many of the 158 executions 
which Saudi Arabia carried out in 2015. Moreover, these executions showed a 
disregard for Sharia law and broke the supplementary laws, which the Saudis 
established.

Although on paper the system is in place to ensure that justice prevails, in 
practice the opposite appears true. Many of these cases which led to execution 
failed to meet the high standards set by Sharia law. (This is true with respect 
to the pre-trial processes, the actual trials, and the decision making for each 
punishment). It is not a coincidence that the executed individuals belonged to 
groups which challenged the ruling Saudi monarchy's legitimacy.

(source: internationalpolicydigest.org)

****************

Beyond the Numbers


"Every nation that proclaims the rule of law at home must respect it abroad and 
every nation that insists on it abroad must enforce it at home." - Kofi Annan

On 2 January 2016, Saudi Arabia executed 47 individuals accused of terrorism, 
in what Human Rights Watch (HRW) called a "shameful start to 2016." Among the 
47 men was a prominent Shi'a cleric who was convicted, according to both 
Amnesty International and HRW, for his non-violent opposition to the Saudi 
regime.

HRW had indicated in 2014 that "Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr was convicted on a host of 
vague charges, based largely on his peaceful criticism of Saudi officials," 
while Amnesty International described it as "a political and grossly unfair 
trial at the Specialised Criminal Court." In addition, today MiddleEastEye 
reported that "prisoners arrested when they were children and others suffering 
from mental illness" were also among those executed.

There are 2 issues here. First, the opposition to the use of the death penalty 
as a matter of principle in criminal sentencing, i.e. a blanket opposition to 
its use in all circumstances, regardless of whether the accused is guilty or 
innocent, and regardless of the nature and severity of the crime.

2nd, even if one supports capital punishment, a key question remains in 
relation to Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights on 2 levels: (1), whether the offence meets the threshold of the "most 
serious crimes" as interpreted by the Human Rights Committee in its General 
Comment No. 6 on the "right to life". And (2), whether the conditions were met 
for a "fair hearing by an independent tribunal" and for the respect of the 
accused's rights during the investigative and criminal proceedings, according 
to international norms and standards.

In dealing with the repercussions of the executions, Saudi Arabia and its 
supporters preferred to focus on the death penalty. It became clear that the 
pro-Saudi press was either unwilling or unable to condemn the executions. Thus, 
many observers were quick - and correct - to draw attention to the fact that 
Iran executes more people on an annual basis, as documented by Amnesty's annual 
review of the death penalty worldwide.

Hence, the tu quoque argument was put to good political use. It is usually 
enough in political polemics to point out the opponent's double standards or 
hypocrisy to weather the storm of criticism in relation to controversial 
affairs or in dealing with 'bad press' - in this case, the executions and the 
counter-claim that Iran lacks the moral standing to point the accusing finger 
at Saudi Arabia.

For Iran and its proponents, the focus was more on the unjust nature of the 
accusations against Sheikh al-Nimr specifically, rather than an outcry against 
the execution of 47 individuals. This is partly due to the fact that Iran has 
no objection to the use of the death penalty in the criminal justice system - 
but also because al-Nimr is Shi'a. The main issue became that of the unjust 
killing of a religious figure whose only fault was to call for a greater voice 
for the disenfranchised Shi'a minority in the Kingdom. Also, his reported 
principled defence (transcending the Sunni-Shi'a divide) of any victim or 
oppressed group - including in Syria - was further evidence for some that he 
was a prisoner and martyr of conscience and not a terrorist.

On both issues - the death penalty and unjust criminal proceedings for 
political dissidents - the 2 regional rivals have a dismal record. Suffice it 
here to point the reader to reports conducted over the years by human rights 
organisations and United Nations committees and special rapporteurs on various 
aspects of these 2 countries' respect for the rule of law and their adherence 
to international human rights norms and standards.

This comment does not seek to get into the "who is better or worst" argument - 
an argument that is conducted on a daily basis by both countries' officials, as 
well as by the 'more of a royalist than the king/ruler' pundits who present 
their reasons as to why either Saudi Arabia or Iran is the true backer of 
moderation and people's concerns in the region.

Rather, the interest here is in exposing the danger to the culture of the 'rule 
of law,' which is undermined ever more deeply by the recent Saudi executions, 
as well as by the reactions we have seen from both sides of the conflict.

The 'rule of law' is an all-encapsulating term for the values of freedom, 
democracy, equality and non-discrimination. It is a concept that is part and 
parcel of all United Nations and development agencies' work in the Middle East 
and beyond. It can be defined, as we see in UN documents, reports and 
resolutions, as follows:

"The rule of law involves adherence to a principle of governance whereby all 
persons... including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced... and which are consistent with 
international human rights norms and standards. It requires...equality before 
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the 
law...avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency."

In judging a state, regime, or any public policy and ruling, the benchmark 
should be the extent to which the 'rule of law' is upheld and the extent to 
which our states' institutions and practices measure up in terms of adhering to 
the above-mentioned definition, especially in terms of the laws being 
"consistent with international human rights norms and standards." This emphasis 
is important to avoid any confusion between the 'rule of law' and 'national 
laws,' which may or may not be consistent with international human rights norms 
and standards.

For proponents of a secular Middle East where the rule of law and human rights 
are respected, the executions should be an issue that goes far beyond the 'tit 
for tat' arguments we have seen thus far in the press. If indeed the purpose of 
the Arab uprisings was/is to express popular dissatisfaction with autocratic 
regimes and to call for greater freedoms and participation in public life, the 
inability to recognise an affront to the rule of law reveals our region's dire 
state of affairs, politically, morally, and intellectually.

It is an unfortunate reminder of our region's devotional partisanship to either 
Iran or Saudi Arabia that we do not have a wide condemnation of abuses, 
wherever they occur, and whoever the alleged perpetrator is. Political 
researcher Ziad Majed piercingly noted in the aftermath of the executions that 
"we have a public that increasingly only cares about the confessional identity 
of the killer and the victims whenever it is confronted with killings, 
repression, and aggression." I had similarly noted in an earlier piece 
regarding selective grief and solidarity that people in the Arab region.

"could care less about the plight of victims from other sects or from opposing 
political parties...each side seems to only care about the crimes committed by 
the opposing parties domestically, and regionally. In Syria, media and 
individual solidarity is dependent on whether one supports Saudi Arabia or 
Iran, and in turn Assad or his opponents."

The ability to maintain a critical eye and the ability to criticise the ruler - 
even if one has voted for him/her - is a hallmark of democratic societies. The 
rule of law is the antidote to the culture of partisanship based on tribal, 
familial, or religious affiliations. It is the ability to call for 
accountability for a wrongdoing, even if the perpetrator is the head of the 
state him/herself. That is the point of elections and a free press. A 
democratic leader is in principle a leader attuned to the needs of his/her 
electorate precisely because his/her re-election or approval rates depend on 
his/her performance and not simply on his/her authority.

One commentator had insightfully argued in 2012 that Arab spring nations do not 
yet grasp freedom of dissent and that "Freedom is not only about majority rule, 
but ensuring that women, religious minorities and intellectual dissenters are 
able to flourish without fear." In other words, freedom is not just about 
elections. And it is not just about removing a dictator.

Freedom is the ability to speak out, including against the ruler, according to 
one's opinions and beliefs, even - and especially - if those opinions and 
beliefs run counter to the ruling class or majority opinion.

This is a crucial point for our societies. Let us not get lost in an argument 
about who executes more or fewer individuals every year, as if a lower ranking 
signals an achievement of sorts for us to take pride in.

Instead, our concern should be whether the vision and struggle for a free 
pluralist democratic Middle Eastern region, where human rights are respected, 
is strengthened or undermined by the execution of 47 individuals in 1 day, and 
by the execution of a political dissident.

And until we are able to assess such situations without a near-automatic resort 
to the tu quoque argument, i.e. that the other side also kills individuals, or 
that the other side kills more individuals every year, we remain completely 
disconnected from the people's rightful chants for dignity, life, social 
justice, freedom, and an end to autocratic political regimes who rule with no 
regard for human lives and individual freedoms.

(source: Halim Shebaya, openDemocracy; Op-Ed----truth-out.org)






EGYPT:

Muslim Brotherhood conspired against state: Egypt's judiciary


Egypt's judicial committee said Sunday that leading figures from the Muslim 
Brotherhood group had schemed against state affairs during former Islamist 
President Mohamed Morsi's one-year rule.

"The Brotherhood's guidance office, the presidency, the government and the 
group's Freedom and Justice Party ran the state's affairs at that time," said 
Ezzat Khamis, chief of the judicial committee that is tasked with appraising 
the Muslim Brotherhood's funds and assets.

The 4 entities were 4 faces of the same coin with no separation of powers 
between the presidency, the party, the guidance office nor the government, 
Khamis added.

The accusations come a day before the 5th anniversary of the 2011 protests 
which ended former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's 30-year rule.

"The documents also indicate that confidential papers related to national 
security were leaked from the presidency," Khamis added.

The committee revealed a number of proposals discovered at the Freedom and 
Justice Party premises, including one concerning the Brotherhood's hostile 
stance towards the Supreme Constitutional Court and the judiciary in general.

The groups drafted several laws to amend a number of articles in the judicial 
authority, including a proposal to appoint the prosecutor general via a 
presidential decree and to reduce judges' retirement age to 60, according to 
Khamis.

He also referred to a document which included a Brotherhood plan to control the 
state's judicial system, and cancel the Supreme Constitutional Court and 
relocate its tasks to the Court of Cassation.

Morsi, the Brotherhood's group member who became Egypt's 1st elected president, 
was deposed in 2013 by the army as a response to mass protests against his 
rule. The Muslim Brotherhood was later designated a terrorist organization in 
2013 by Egyptian authorities.

A number of its members and leaders, including the group's supreme guide, 
Mohammed Badie, were sentenced to death, but the sentences have not yet been 
carried out and may still be appealed.

Brotherhood leaders, including Morsi, are imprisoned awaiting to be tried for 
charges related to inciting violence, conspiring with foreign powers to 
undermine Egypt, and the killing of protestors. Some charges carry the death 
penalty.

(source: ghanaweb.com)






UNITED KINGDOM/PAKISTAN:

2 Pakistani hitmen confess to killing of Imran Farooq in London ---- Exclusive: 
2 alleged assassins have revealed details of murder of exiled politician as 
they testified that they travelled from Pakistan to carry out the killing


2 alleged assassins of a Pakistani politician knifed to death on a London 
street have testified that they travelled from Pakistan to commit the killing 
on the orders of rival British-based leaders of his party.

The confessions are the latest twist in the grisly killing of Imran Farooq, an 
exiled leader of a controversial Pakistan political party who was stabbed 
outside his north London home in 2010.

The murder brought Pakistan's violent gangster politics to suburban Edgware, 
where Mr Farooq lived an apparently low-key life with his wife and young sons 
in a quiet side street lined with apple trees.

Unbeknown to his neighbours, Mr Farooq was also a leader of the the Muttahida 
Qaumi Movement (MQM), a party with a long association with violence in his 
homeland. He was granted asylum in Britain and later gained British 
citizenship, but he was believed to be planning to form a breakaway faction 
when he was murdered.

Details of their confessions to a closed court hearing in Pakistan have now 
been leaked to The Sunday Telegraph by an official close to the investigation. 
They reveal how the killers allegedly bought a five-inch knife from a high 
street "pound store" and then struck at their victim as he arrived home from 
work.

It was later recovered at the scene, along with a brick used to bludgeon their 
victim.

The crude means of dispatching their target could not have been more different 
than the polonium used in the murder of former Russian spy Alexander 
Litvinenko, which a public inquiry last week week blamed on the Kremlin.

But it has demonstrated once again the relative ease with which foreign hitmen 
could fly into Britain to settle political scores on the streets of London.

The 2 alleged Pakistani hit-men, Khalid Shahim and Syed Mohsin Ali, revealed 
details of the killings in "confessional statements", recorded and sworn before 
a presiding magistrate, that are considered court evidence under Pakistani law.

Mr Mohsin Ali said that he grabbed Mr Farooq as he arrived outside his home, 
while another MQM operative slashed his neck with the knife

He added that both had been monitoring his movements so that they knew his 
routine. The killers struck at 5.30pm on a September afternoon and then headed 
straight to the airport to flee back to Pakistan that night.

They had travelled to Britain on student visas obtained by another alleged 
conspirator in Pakistan and stayed at an unidentified college hostel while they 
planned the attack, he added.

A 3rd arrested man, Moazzam Ali, is alleged to have provided them with the 
logistics for their trip to Britain. The use of student visas will raise fresh 
concerns in Britain about the potential for abuse of that system.

The 2 men were arrested last year as they tried to slip into Pakistan from 
Afghanistan and appeared before a special terrorism court last Thursday.

They said that the murder plot was ordered because Mr Farooq was deemed a 
"potent threat" to the MQM leadership.

Mr Khalid said that they operated under the direction of Mohammad Anwar, a 
senior lieutenant of Altaf Hussein, the London-based head of the MQM. The funds 
to execute the mission were also provided from London, he added.

Scotland Yard detectives are understood to have travelled to Pakistan to 
interview the men in September. Although the 2 countries do not have an 
extradition treaty, proceedings are believed to have been underway and Pakistan 
has indicated that it would be willing to hand the men over.

Since the arrests, Islamabad has attempted to intensify pressure on Britain to 
bring charges over the murder against Mr Hussein and other exiled party leaders 
in London.

Mr Hussein has consistently denied any involvement in the murder of Mr Farooq. 
His supporters claim that the allegations against him are part of a 
long-running political smear campaign by political foes in Pakistan.

But Pakistan's federal investigation agency (FIA) has now filed a court report 
naming Mr Hussein and several allies as co-conspirators in the murder for the 
1st time.

In the filing, seen by The Telegraph, the FIA's counter-terrorism wing states: 
"The assassination of Imran Farooq was the result of a conspiracy hatched in UK 
and Pakistan, by among others, Altaf Hussain, Mohammad Anwar [another senior 
member] and Iftikhar Hussain [the leader's nephew]."

It claims that the Mr Farooq was murdered "to remove the threat to the 
leadership of the MQM of Altaf Hussain and to intimidate/overawe public in 
general and workers/members of MQM in particular by creating a sense of fear 
and insecurity in the community".

The case, known as a "1st information report", covers charges of conspiracy, 
assistance, abetment and ultimate assassination and murder under sections of 
the Pakistan Penal Code and Anti-Terrorism Act. The crimes carry the death 
penalty.

The Telegraph has learned that Pakistani officials have become frustrated that 
Scotland Yard has not launched any proceedings against MQM leaders in London. 
Mr Hussain has previously been questioned in Britain as part of a 
money-laundering investigation.

Pakistan has now indicated that it might use the new testimony to apply for the 
extradition of Mr Hussain and his cohorts via Interpol. The request would go 
nowhere as Britain will not extradite to a country for a death penalty offence, 
but Islamabad may make a request as an attempt to try to exert further pressure 
on Britain.

After the accused assassins gave their statements, the MQM issues a statement 
denying that any member of the party was involved in the murder.

"We categorically state that no party personnel have had anything whatever to 
do with the tragic death of Dr Farooq. We mourn the loss of a man who was our 
friend and colleague for many years.

"MQM welcomes any assistance that may be provided to the British Metropolitan 
Police Service, who continue to investigate the death of Dr Farooq."

(source: The Telegraph)