[Deathpenalty] death penalty news----worldwide
Rick Halperin
rhalperi at smu.edu
Mon Sep 28 06:24:36 CDT 2015
Sept. 28
INDIA:
When It Comes To Terror, Law Commission Flinches At Its Own Findings
The Law Commission's recommendations to abolish death penalty for all offences
except terror has been much lauded - but the fact is that it has stepped back
from its own conclusions about judicial arbitrariness
In the global discourse on the gradual abolition of death penalty, the 262nd
report of the Law Commission of India is going to be an important milestone, as
it represents one-sixth of humanity. The Commission chief recommendation is
that the death penalty be abolished in all cases except for terror cases and
cases of waging war against the State often a concomitant charge in terror
cases). Though not unequivocal in its rejection of capital punishment, it has
concluded that the arguments against death penalty, even for terror cases, are
substantial, and has called for 'a more rational, principled and informed
debate on the abolition of the death penalty for all crimes.'
This is important since in most debates about death penalty, its popular appeal
as a befitting punishment for heinous crimes has for long prevailed over any
reasoned argument against it. So much so that, the opponents of death penalty
are often accused of sympathising with the perpetrators of horrific crimes
rather than their victims. The phenomenon of terrorism has further stifled the
debate, since those who challenge the rationale behind capital punishment can
easily be labelled as 'traitors' in such cases.
The doctrine of 'rarest of rare', laid down by the Supreme Court as a
prerequisite in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab in the year 1980,
is the decisive factor for arriving at whether or not to award capital
punishment in a case. The Law Commission, by examining several such cases in
its report, has completely exposed the lack of a principled approach by the
Supreme Court when it comes to following its own doctrine.
An astounding revelation such as this - that the maximum punishment has been
awarded arbitrarily - would have been sufficient for the higher courts in India
to declare death penalty unconstitutional, since it violates the right to
equality. The reason it has not happened is because of what may seem a
technicality - the notion that fundamental rights given to the individual by
the Constitution is against the state and not the judiciary, and therefore the
judiciary cannot by definition violate these rights. This is why, despite
having completely demolished the arguments in favour of death penalty as
practiced by the courts, the Commission has pinned its hope on the legislature
and not the judiciary for its abolition.
Terror still the exception Nevertheless, the Commission's report quotes with
approval the Supreme Court judgements in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India
(2014), where it said that devising a separate category for terror cases within
'rarest of rare' cases is flawed. This case relates to the issue of inordinate
delay in the disposal of mercy petitions by the President of India or the
Governors of State which are filed by or on behalf of the convicts condemned to
death after the conclusion of the judicial process.
The Court in this case had commuted the death penalty of several convicts to
life imprisonment, citing that keeping convicts waiting for an unreasonably
long period of time on their mercy petitions amounts to infliction of cruelty.
In the same case, the Supreme Court declared its own earlier judgement, in the
case of Devendar Pal Singh Bhullar v. (State) NCT of Delhi (2013), bad in law.
In that case, the court had held that a person sentenced to death under an
anti-terror law (in this case, TADA) cannot claim that his death sentence
should be commuted to life imprisonment on the ground of inordinate delay in
the disposal of his mercy petition.
The Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan observed that 'all death sentences
imposed are impliedly the most heinous and barbaric and rarest of its kind. The
legal effect of the extraordinary depravity of the offence exhausts itself when
court sentences the person to death for that offence.' Given how the Court has
enunciated this principle, any attempt by the legislature to distinguish terror
and non-terror offences so as to inflict death penalty is likely to be
constitutionally vulnerable before a court of law.
Unsound jurisprudence
The Law Commission's recommendation to retain death penalty in terror cases is
unsound also in terms of jurisprudence. Anti-terror laws reduce the threshold
for the basis of conviction by making evidences otherwise not admissible under
the Indian Evidence Act, admissible. For example, confessions made before the
police-officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police are admissible
under most anti-terror laws. Given such exemptions, there's a greater
probability of innocents being convicted under these laws; all the more reason
why the law must guard against providing for an irreversible punishment like
death penalty in such cases.
A useful comparison would be to cases of 'Dowry death' under the Indian Penal
Code. In such a case, if a woman dies under abnormal circumstances within seven
years of her marriage, the law allows for the presumption that the woman's
husband or his relatives may have possibly caused her death in connection with
a demand for dowry. Here, because this provision lowers the threshold otherwise
required for proving culpability in a murder case, it also proscribe death
penalty as the punishment, instead restricting it to not less than seven years
imprisonment which may extend to life.
Further, even if a law (in this case, anti-terror laws) retains death penalty,
it cannot make it the only punishment for such offences. It must include
provision of life imprisonment as an option, without which it would be
unconstitutional, as the Supreme Court has held in the case of Mithu Singh v.
State of Punjab (1983).
What this means is that the discretion to decide which case deserves death
penalty will still vest with the courts. How the courts will then be able to
evade the lingering charge of judicial indiscretion bordering on arbitrariness
- a fact the Commission itself arrived at in its report - remains unanswered.
Such quandaries could have been avoided, if only the Law Commission had found
the gumption to examine the merits and demerits of death penalty in cases
related to terrorism as well.
(source: Manwendra Kumar Tiwari is Assistant Professor, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya
National Law University, Lucknow----The Wire)
****************
Wrong to seek death penalty----Death penalty is a primitive, vengeful and
unjust
After a trial court in Mumbai earlier this month found 12 of the 13 accused
persons charged for planting bombs in the city???s local trains on July 11,
2006, the prosecution has sought death penalty for 8 of the 12 convicts. The
demand for death penalty is reflexively made by the prosecution and by sections
of the public in most cases of murder, especially when the offences are related
to terrorism. It is as if the prosecution thinks its efforts are successful
only when the accused are awarded the ultimate penalty. This wrong notion
continues even when there are cases of the death penalty being awarded wrongly
and there is increasing demand and action the world over for its abolition. The
idea that death penalty is a primitive, vengeful and unjust form of punishment
and that it has no deterrent value is gaining more acceptance everywhere but
India is among the last few holdouts where it is legally prescribed, sanctioned
and practised.
The 7/11 Mumbai serial bomb blasts were among the worst terrorist attacks in
the country's history. About 200 people were killed and over 1,000 others
injured in the attack. The case has taken a long time to come to a conclusion,
but this is not final as the verdict is certain to be appealed in higher
courts. The case was complex and involved examination of a lot of evidence and
a large number of witnesses. The investigations were controversial too with 2
investigating agencies - the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad and the Mumbai
crime branch - contradicting each other and charges of custodial torture and
forced confessions being widely made. But these issues are to be examined again
in the appeals. The matter of immediate interest now is the quantum of
punishment and whether the court would accept the demand for death penalty as
made by the prosecution.
There is no doubt that those who were found to have perpetrated the crime
should receive stringent punishment. But no stringent punishment should take
the form of the ultimate punishment of taking the life of the accused, even if
the crime was the killing of people. Human justice can always go astray and the
best evidence in many cases has collapsed in course of time. In this case too
the court acquitted 1 accused who had spent 9 years in jail. The prosecution
has taken the Law Commission???s support to plead for death penalty. But it is
wrong to award it in terrorism cases as much as it is wrong in other cases. The
court will hopefully reject the counsel for the most extreme punishment.
(source: Deccan Herald)
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